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Philosophical Hermeneutics and Ontology 
In his contribution to this collection of papers, Gaetano Chiurazzi offers an essay on “The 
Ontology of Hermeneutical Practice” which refers to hermeneutics as a “universality without 
domain.”  For the sake of this introduction, we will reverse the equation and speak of 
domains without specifiable universality. Chiurazzi’s notion is an apt way of formulating a 
formal characteristic of hermeneutics, the humanities and related practices that pursue 
conceptual subject-matters whose nature is not fixed but historically accrued. Hermeneutics 
and its affiliates are not closed fields of enquiry but emergent modes of intellectual practice 
whose character or “essence” is continually altered and expanded by application. In formal 
terms, hermeneutics is an open field of enquiry, a domain which cannot be limited by any 
pre-established definition. What hermeneutics is and can become remains an open question. 
Possible responses to the question can only be sensed in on-going, revealing, but never 
conclusive debate. Such dialogical engagement and participation guarantees hermeneutics its 
continuing power to historically effect.  
The notion of hermeneutics as an open domain without closed universality offers an 
appropriate vantage from which to introduce this body of work on Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics. Although each essay offers a different perspective on aspects of his position. 
none represent it definitively. Philosophical hermeneutics is an open domain of enquiry 
whose characteristics cannot be fully specified. There is amble evidence of this claim within 
philosophical hermeneutics itself. It is not susceptible to complete conceptual description. 
What it  has become known as is a consequence of on-going historical narratives which can 
never by definition be complete. The history of understanding and its interpretation is on-
going. There is, therefore, no reason to suppose that what has become known as philosophical 
hermeneutics is exhaustive. It remains an open domain, incomplete but always capable of a 
completer rendition.  
Philosophical hermeneutics may be an open domain but its general character can be surmised 
from the history of its effects. Though the conception of a Wirkungsgeschichte is close to 
Gadamer’s heart, the history of a concept’s effects can itself never be definitive. The issue 
here is not the epistemological finitude of historical understanding per se but its ontological 
character, that is, the on-going and hence incomplete nature of historical disclosure. 
Philosophical hermeneutics is heavily dependent upon Heidegger’s ontological conception of 
understanding. This is particularly manifest in Gadamer’s conception of “linguistically” or 
Sprachlichkeit. Language too is an open domain: What will become effective configurations 
of a meaning-cluster are invariably working towards us from the past. Yet what those 
configurations reveal will be dependent upon unknown circumstances approaching us from 
the future that will, in turn, influence the manner of their disclosure. It is the nature of the 
history of effects to be always underway and to remain open to as yet unrealised potentials of 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in journal of the british 
society for phenomenology on [date of publication], available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/
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meaning. In Heidegger’s terms, what interpretation draws out is an effect of the potentials 
within understanding itself. Inotherwords, the historical effect makes known the presence of 
the unknown. It follows that though a history of conceptual effects can and does reveal 
aspects of the domain we call philosophical hermeneutics it also discloses that such a domain 
never be brought to reflection in its entirety. 
 These comments emphasise is that philosophical hermeneutics is not a specifiable theory or   
philosophy of understanding but primarily a mode of reflecting upon what is already at play 
within communicative practices and the experiences of meaning they facilitate. A 
perspectival approach to experience necessarily widens the subjective horizons which 
characterise individual consciousness. A dialogical approach to experience broadens an 
awareness of the effects at play within it and that expansion adds to the collective reality of 
the subject-matters which shape individual experience. Given that philosophical 
hermeneutics is indeed an open domain, a perspectival, dialogical, and participatory approach 
to its concerns is not only an appropriate philosophical approach to the discipline but also 
potentially extends its cultural and intellectual effects.  
The essays in this collection all attest to the diverse intellectual effects of philosophical 
hermeneutics.  John Arthos’s piece “Out of the Cave of the Cyclops” offers a powerful case 
for considering hermeneutics as a mode of rhetorical reasoning that operates independently of 
the cyclopic tendency of modern methodological reasoning. In Gadamer’s Truth and Method  
the opposition between scientific reasoning and hermeneutical reasoning collapses into a 
binary. The question that Arthos’s presentation is sensitive to  is what happens to a culture 
and its educational institutions  when belief in the unquestionable nature of scientific truth 
and reasoning is abandoned. Arthos’s essay has proved prescient in that it was written just 
months before the UK Referendum on Europe and the Presidential Election in the U.S.A. At 
a time when there is a broad scepticism regarding what Nietzsche called the “big words” in 
politics and morality, the skill of discerning and navigating the gaps between what a speaker 
is saying and the meaning of what is said could not be politically more relevant. The fact that 
there is no longer a final arbiter with regard to the “truth” of an interpretation strengthens the 
case for hermeneutics as a rhetorical skill. It emphasises the need for discernment and 
judgement, for finding in a climate of uncertainty the most reasonable case amongst many for 
a position we will have to act on. Patient, responsible and discerning reading and the skill to 
both move between and, depending upon the circumstances, to choose between various 
patterns of reasoning is what hermeneutics considered as a rhetorical skill can offer 
contemporary educational institutions. 
Gaetano Chiurazzi’s paper “Universality without Domain: The Ontology of Hermeneutical 
Practice” follows Arthos’s contribution in a precise way. Whereas the later puts a broad case 
for hermeneutics to be considered as a rhetorical domain, Chiurazzi’s paper offers an acute 
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analysis of the specific logical structure of the fundamental concepts within the humanities as 
opposed to those of physics and mathematics. Their very openness proves crucial. In this 
respect the author notes that “the ethical message which crosses the whole project of Truth 
and Method can then be summed up in the idea that there is a certain excess of the experience 
of the human sciences in comparison to every fixed and controlled domain of the methodical 
sciences.” In Truth and Method Gadamer describes the process of translation as a process that 
though it may aspire to be as loyal as possible to an original text, always confronts us with 
the impossibility of completely rendering the sense of a text in translation: a difference 
always remains. The translator is confronted with a semantic excess for which the target 
language has no word, forcing a choice: she must determine—or rationalize—this relative 
indeterminacy, which appears in relation to the target language but certainly not in relation to 
the source language. “In our translation if we want to emphasise a feature of the original that 
is important to us, then we can do so only by playing down or entirely suppressing other 
features. But this is precisely the activity that we call interpretation. Translation, like all 
interpretation, is a highlighting. A translator must understand that highlighting is part of his 
task. Obviously he must not leave open whatever is not clear to him. He must show his 
colours.” Nevertheless, this openness is part of the very strength of hermeneutical reasoning. 
Precisely because the domain of its terms are open rather than closed, every new 
interpretation adds to its subject-matter. Chiurazzi’s key claim is that in hermeneutics and the 
humanities the constitution of the universal is not founded on repetition, abstraction and 
induction—as it is in scientific knowledge—but upon integration and increase. Within 
hermeneutics “more universal is not what presents a lesser number of connotations, but on 
the contrary, what presents a greater number of intensional characters or determinations.” 
That hermeneutics has an excess of meaning, that no translation can be reduced to another 
and that no interpretation can be logically commensurate with its subject-matter affirm the  
the impossibility of hermeneutics but, on the contrary, demonstrates its vital importance. 
Only through constant engagement with interpretation and translation can the consequent 
generation of differences increase and magnify the cultural universals constituted and 
transmitted by hermeneutics.   
 
    Nicholas Davey’s contribution “The Impossible Future of Hermeneutics” deals with a 
related set of methodological issues. The essay argues that deconstructive and post-
structuralist criticism is in many respects justified in its formal attack on hermeneutics. 
Hermeneutics is in need of re-thinking as Arthos points out, but the mode of deconstruction’s 
criticism is theoretically skewed and obscures what can be meaningfully re-constructed in the 
discipline. Deconstructive criticism is not incorrect: it is right to insist that there can be no 
final interpretation but where it goes wrong concerns a failure of its own making. Critics of 
hermeneutics often fail to grasp that what it perceived as a disabling limit to interpretation is 
infact the enabling presupposition of the endlessly transformative nature of interpretation. 
Deconstructive thought cannot criticise philosophical hermeneutics for failing to get to the 
bottom of things since the very supposition of final meaning is itself erroneous. What 
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deconstruction identifies as the formal impossibility of hermeneutics actually establishes the 
practical possibility of hermeneutics. What delimits and seemingly negates the formal 
possibility of hermeneutics - the inability of interpretation to exhaust the infinite 
determinations of its object -  infact enables hermeneutics to extend its finite understandings 
infinitely. Completeness and infinity are not features of understandable objects but of the 
endlessly repeatable processes of understanding themselves. If hermeneutic understanding 
were understood as just the linear progress towards an ever more accurate account of a final 
truth, no recursive looping would be possible. As a consequence, the reflective understanding 
which emerges from recursive looping could not itself occur. Thus, the points of continuity 
and difference, the development of narrative patterns and points of re-appraisal which 
constitute the emergence of hermeneutic consciousness would not themselves arise. 
Inotherwords, hermeneutic understanding depends upon the endless recurrence of non-
identical processes of repetition. Hermeneutic truth is not arrived at as the intended terminus 
of a methodological enquiry. Rather hermeneutic truth is a practice based emergence, the 
adjunctive effect  of recursive looping within a given practice. Deconstructive criticism of 
hermeneutics for failing to ever arrive at the truth is dangerous not because its claim is wrong 
but because it blurs what is really at stake, i.e. promoting the conditions which enable the 
emergence of hermeneutic truths. Philosophical hermeneutics responds to Nietzsche’s 
question concerning the value of truth: the ‘truth” is valuable not in-itself but for what its 
pursuit gives rise to, namely, the unexpected and potentially transformative emergence of 
hermeneutic insight into our own mode of being. 
 
Ontology and the question of effects continue to have a very strong presence in Jan Iver 
Linden’s paper  ’’Causality, Action and Effective History. Chiurrazi’s and Davey’s papers 
both acknowledge how philosophical hermeneutics is profoundly grounded in Heidegger’s 
ontological revolution i.e. that understanding is a mode of our being and consequently 
extends far beyond what we think of it as being. Linden’s essay explores the implications of 
this argument for the hermeneutical grasp of history, 
 
    For Linden history offers a particular challenge for hermeneutical understanding. 
Cutomarily, history is juxtaposed with nature as without its opposite history is reduced to 
being only a matter of human culture.  However this erroneous binary masks the fact that 
culture is a mode of being and that such a particular way of being is not something we can 
locate. It has no spatial place, because culture is a way of being disposed to place. The 
implication of prioritising ontology here suggests that there can be no distinct demarcation 
between what is cultural and what is another non-cultural sphere of reality. Linden grasps the 
point clearly: reality is already at work inside our cultural world, or to put it more precisely: 
there is nothing in culture which makes it possible to locate it inside a border. Culture is not a 
human space inside reality, but a specific human way of inhering in reality. This also 
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suggests that nature cannot be regarded as something external to culture, but must be 
understood as a specific aspect of our cultural world. Linden names this aspect life suggesting 
in the fashion of Spinoza’s idea of a natura naturans: a creative process, which brings itself 
to expression1 in history. Linden suggests that inside this singular historical process, in which 
the now turns possibilities into given irrevocabilities, there are multiple strains, nuances, and 
variations which render the life process complex and rich in meaning. The key argument 
becomes clear. “For objectivistic conceptions of reality this means that their epistemic claims 
can have validity only inside an orientation which has opted for objectification as its main 
strategy. Such a strategy is meaningful and in several contexts also legitimate because of the 
aims and ends presupposed – but itself, it can never be understood through the objective 
sphere which it has constituted. What can be understood is however the constellation of ends, 
motives, research activity and results, i. e. the specific modality of being in such 
manifestations of reality.”  We inhere in reality in several ways, and though epistemic mode 
is an essential one it is not the only one.    
 
 For Linden to understand processural history requires not an ever finer determination of 
historical cause and effect but a discernment of what such a history reveals ontically, its 
structural patterns and their enabling importance. History should interest us not as a body of 
epistemic objectifications but for it reveals of our concerns as temporal modes of being in the 
world. The ontological importance of history for hermeneutics lies in the fact that it brings to 
expression patterns of reality as it is lived and thereby extends our sense of the world we live 
in.  
 
      Linden’s argument has a clear theme that carries over into  Cynthia Nielson’s essay 
“  Gadamer and Scholz on Solidarity: Disclosing, Avowing, and Performing Solidaristic Ties 
with Human and Natural Others.” Linden reminds us that, ontologically speaking, it is not the 
events described in historical scholarship that are primary but rather the prior orientation of 
concerns  - or way of being - whose nature manifests itself in and through how historical 
historical events are described.  Historical scholarship makes manifest a way of being that 
tracks and traces itself in the world through previously established patterns of temporal 
continuity and discontinuity. The character of a way of being is discerned through what it 
brings to light in its sense-making practices. Nielson’s approach to Gadamer’s practical 
                                                 
1 Cf. G. Deleuze, Spinoza et le problème de l'expression, Èditions de Minuit, Paris 1968. 
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philosophy is not to announce or advocate a moral or political conception of solidarity but to 
discern its ontological presence in an through the diversity of human engagements.   
 
 It is plain that in talking of practice in relationship to hermeneutics, Nielson is not talking 
about practical philosophy as it has been predominantly conceived since Kant. To speak of a 
philosopher’s practical philosophy is generally to draw attention to his or her moral 
philosophy. Robert Pippin’s book on Hegel’s Practical Philosophy makes this perfectly 
clear: “by practical philosophy most philosophers would mean an account of the distinct sort 
of events for which we may appropriately demand reasons or justifications from subjects 
whom we take to be responsible for such events.”2 If the meaning of practical philosophy is 
read ethically, it might initially seem that Gadamer’s has surprisingly little to do with such 
debates. Authors such as Matthew Foster asks specifically why does Gadamer remain 
“remain silent about much that is critical important to the viability of practical philosophy?”3 
An illuminating and fitting answer is suggested by David Cooper. Speaking of Heidegger and 
Wittgenstein in the context of Ancient Chinese Philosophy he makes a remark that is equally 
telling of Gadamer. 
 
No doubt these writers have their individual reasons for apparent hostility or 
indeifference to moral discourse. I suspect however that they all share the sense, 
indicated by the remark from Tao Te Ching, that so to speak, ethics comes to late: 
something has already gone wrong with our lives when pre-occupation with good 
versus evil, with rights and values, sets in. The Way is already lost, the experience of 
mystery already forgotten. Be that as it may, and despite these hostile remarks, it is 
clear that none of these writers is without a perception of how our lives should go. 
Moreover, there is surely an agreement among them that these should be lives in 
awareness of the “things that cannot be put into words”.4  
 
In certain respects Forster is right. Gadamer is silent on what is conventionally understood as 
normative ethics. The strength of Nielson’s paper is to suggest that solidarity is not a political 
end or moral ideal but rather something that is phenomenologically revealed in and through 
our practical engagement with an increasingly discovered shared world of concerns. Nielson 
                                                 
2 Robert Pippin, ‘Hegels Ethical Philosophy, Rational Agency as Ethical Life, London, Cambridge University 
Press, 2008, p.1. 
3 Matthew Foster, Gadamer and Practical Philosophy,  Georgia, Scholars Press, 1991, p. 240.  
4 David Cooper, The Measure of Things, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 353. 
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makes it clear that solidarity with others has nothing to do with arbitrary and changeable 
allegiances to an interest group. She argues that while traditions are always open and allow 
for both movement and play, their shared practices and common texts facilitate a staying 
power or permanence that endures for decades and even centuries.” Her argument implies 
that solidarity within a tradition can in some ways be marked out by shared practices, texts, 
and teachings but they are portals to a deeper and more fundamental solidarity. The offer 
entry into a way of being that is characterised by a vulnerability and surrender to the 
constituting questions that forms that path or practice. The solidarity of a religious 
community is not a matter of a shared doxology but of an emergent solidarity which becomes 
apparent that despite diversities of religious orientation all are struggling with analogous and 
hence shareable spiritual concerns. It is the very diversity of approaches that constitutes a 
“we”,  a community that finds its solidarity in albeit different expressed shared concerns. 
Once again, the papers in this collection overlap. Nielsons notion of “solidarity” is precisely 
one of those open humanistic concepts that constitutes itself in and through the diversity of its 
application.  Nielson’s case for an ontologically discerned solidarity matches both Linden’s 
case for the priority of  ontic-commitments in our practices and Arthos plea for a 
hermeneutics that is politically and culturally relevant in our fragmented times. 
 
  George Taylor’s presentation “Practical Hermeneutics: The Legal Text and Beyond” 
endeavours to demonstrate the continuing practical relevance of hermeneutics through the 
example of legal interpretation. The paper examines the very concrete nature of legal 
hermeneutics within everyday legal practice – the interrelation of meaning and application – 
and endeavours to show how legal hermeneutics, and hermeneutics more generally, offers 
what Ricoeur calls an interpretive “choice in favour of meaning.” Taylor’s speaks to many of 
the formal difficulties that confront hermeneutics considered theoretically-  
incommensurability, incompleteness, openness of domain - and demonstrates that within the 
practical constraints of legal debate these technical features of hermeneutics actually extend 
the scope of understanding. The argument Taylor builds reflects a small but highly significant 
passage towards the end of Truth and Method in which Gadamer laments the distorting and 
reductive power of statemental language: “Any one who has experienced an interrogation - 
even if only as a witness - knows what it is to make a statement and how little it is a 
statement of what one means. In a statement the horizon of meaning of what is to be said is 
concealed by methodological exactness … meaning thus reduced to what is stated is always 
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distorted meaning.”5 In the arguments of Arthos, and Chiurazzi we have seen how an 
awareness of the finitude of understanding and an appreciation of its linguistic limits does not 
so much curtail the range of understanding as open up its speculative dimensions and, hence, 
other un-anticipated possibilities for insight. The practical import of Taylor’s argument is 
clear: the task of legal representation is not so much to get behind the statement as to 
appreciate the fuller speculative context which informs any statement. Taylor is right to stress 
Gadamer’s remarks on ‘the exemplary significance of legal hermeneutics’ for hermeneutics 
generally.6  Because legal hermeneutics knows that no judgement can be taken as definitive, 
it is always committed to seek for a fuller completer understanding. In these fractious times 
Taylor argues, hermeneutics itself becomes exemplary: it knows that meaning is not given 
but that our humanity depends upon its undying pursuit.  
 
Nicholas Davey 
University of Dundee. 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
                                                 
5 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, London, Sheed and Ward, 1989, p. 469 
6 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method,  London, Sheed and Ward, 1989, p. 324. 
